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Abstract 
Due to the accelerated dynamics of scientific and technological modernisation over 
the last few decades, the sharp and unambiguous categorical distinction and sepa-
ration between "nature" and "society" that has been essential for the self-
perception of Western modernity is increasingly subject to erosion or even dissolu-
tion. The article aims to explore the possible consequences of this blurring of 
boundaries with regard to the generation, social perception, and justification of 
social inequalities in "reflexive modern" societies. Using the examples of cosmetic 
surgery and predictive genetic testing, current tendencies of a seemingly paradoxi-
cal "renaturalisation" of inequality are outlined: contrary as well as parallel to the 
modern programme and promise of a "denaturalisation of society" (Jürgen Haber-
mas), "natural" characteristics such as physical appearance or genetic constitution 
are gaining importance in terms of social distinction and discrimination. One 
should, however, not fail to see that this renaturalisation is not simply a revival of 
older (if by no means definitely overcome) forms of social inequalities based on 
(presumedly) natural collective categories (sex, race, ethnicity and so on). Rather, a 
hybrid, scientifically and technically manufactured human "nature" becomes a me-
dium of novel forms of "individualised" discrimination: physical characteristics are 
no longer ascribed to certain groups or people as their inalterable natural qualities, 
but are increasingly conceived of as open to fashioning and therefore as socially 
achieved by the individual person. For this reason, the new inequalities "beyond" 
the modern nature-society divide are apparently not considered fundamentally 
illegitimate or "pre-modern". What seems to be needed in present-day societies is 
the establishment of new, socially accepted regulations and boundaries for the 
complex and intertwined dynamics of denaturalisation and renaturalisation of the 
social. 
                                                                 
1 I would like to thank two anonymous reviewers and the editors of the journal for their 
helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article. 
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1 Introduction: Denaturalisation 
or Renaturalisation of Social 
Inequalities? 
At least in their own self-esteem, mod-
ern Western societies follow a logic of 
a continuing "desocialising of nature" 
and "denaturalising of society" (Haber-
mas 1981: 80).2 According to Haber-
mas (ibid.), the basis of this is the 
categorical distinction and separation 
between the "causal connections of 
nature" on the one hand, and the 
"normative orders of society" on the 
other. Apparently, this distinction is of 
central importance for the develop-
ment and justification of social ine-
qualities in modern societies. The self-
perception and moral foundations of 
Western modernity legitimise only 
those forms of unequal treatment that 
are based on social, achieved traits of 
certain persons or groups, while dis-
crimination referring to ascribed, (ac-
tually or presumedly) natural differ-
ences is attributed to "traditional" so-
cieties and is therefore no longer ac-
ceptable.3 In the course of societal 
modernisation, one can thus expect 
that there will be an increasingly pre-
cise distinction between natural and 
achieved traits as well as a tendency to 
denaturalise social inequalities, which 
will result in a gradual repression of 
discrimination based on a certain per-
son's or group's "natural" characteris-
tics (sex, skin colour, race, ethnicity, 
etc.). Of course, modern societies do 
not reach the high standards they have 
set for themselves; discrimination 
based on natural categories still exists, 
and is even produced by those socie-
ties themselves. Nevertheless, modern 
laws and normative systems at least 
delegitimate nature-based social ine-
qualities as, for instance, can be seen 
in the anti-discrimination laws the 
                                                                 
2 The quotations from German books or 
journals have been translated by the au-
thor of this article. 
3 Talcott Parsons' (1951: 58-67) well-known 
distinction between "ascription" and 
"achievement" points in the same direction; 
it is based on the distinction between tradi-
tional "community" and modern "society" 
(cf. Münch 2004: 63-69).  
member states of the European Union 
are obliged to sign.4 
The distinction, be it explicit or im-
plicit, between "social" and "natural", 
between the "made" (dem Gemachten) 
and the "grown" (dem Gewachs enen) 
(Habermas 2001) should not be mis-
understood in an objectivist sense. It is 
not a factual, ontological difference, 
but the result of a social practice of 
distinction, a "boundary work" (Gieryn 
1995) performed mainly by science. It 
is not crucial whether certain charac-
teristics individuals or groups are cred-
ited with are "really" of natural or so-
cial origin, but whether they can be 
attributed to either nature or society in 
an uncontested way.5 However, ac-
cording to Habermas (1981: 80), mod-
ern Western societies are convinced 
that they (and they alone) make the 
"correct conceptual cuts" between 
natural causalities and social actions. 
The constructive and contingent char-
acter of these "cuts" is hidden by scien-
tific "purification practices" as de-
scribed by Bruno Latour. He argues 
that only these purifications give rise 
to "two completely separate ontologi-
cal zones, that of humans on the one 
hand, and that of non-humans on the 
other" (Latour 1995: 19). In this way, 
the modern distinction between nature 
and society presents itself as merely a 
"discovery" of an objectively existing 
ontological difference that can thus 
claim general validity and unambigu-
ity.  
                                                                 
4 The massive protests in Germany in 
spring 2005 against proposed anti-
discrimination laws can be regarded as an 
illustration of the fact that discrimination 
based on (ascribed) natural categories is 
still rampant in the everyday life of modern 
societies – regardless of the normative and 
legal superstructure. 
5 In some cases (for example, regarding 
intelligence) the attribution may be con-
tested; in others it may be changed due to 
new scientific research, for example in the 
area of human genetics. Nevertheless, 
modern societies distinguish mainly with 
the help of the nature-society difference 
between legitimate and illegitimate reasons 
for differential treatment. It goes without 
saying that there is still illegitimate dis-
crimination (for example, concerning reli-
gious beliefs or political convictions) that is 
not based on natural categories. 
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What does it mean for the production 
and legitimation of social inequalities 
that the distinction between "nature" 
and "society" has become ambiguous, 
and even seems to evaporate com-
pletely? This thesis is strongly sup-
ported by much of the research re-
cently conducted, particularly in sci-
ence and technology studies (e.g. La-
tour 1995; Amann 2000; Lindemann 
2002; Karafyllis 2003) and in social 
theory, especially within the "theory of 
reflexive modernisation" (Lau/Keller 
2001; Viehöver et al. 2004; Wehling et 
al. 2005). Accor ding to these theories, 
the growing scientific and technical 
control of natural processes itself as 
well as the intense social use of the 
resulting options are decisive in terms 
of blurring the nature/society distinc-
tion. I want to take up these argu-
ments and show that both the cogni-
tive-discursive and the practical-
material erosion of the distinction 
between nature and society opens a 
new space of categorical and norma-
tive ambiguity. This new space allows 
the development of phenomena of 
inequality and domination that seem 
to be based on natural categories in a 
new way. The term "renaturalisation" 
can only tentatively describe this ten-
dency since it is not just a revival of 
traditional, ascriptive inequalities. 
Instead, a hybrid, scientifically medi-
ated, and technically manufactured 
"nature" gains relevance for forms and 
processes of social distinction which is 
not regarded as simply "premodern" or 
illegitimate.  
In the following, I will first explain the 
extent to which it is possible to speak 
of an erosion of the modern distinc-
tion between nature and society in the 
light of recent scientific, technological, 
and social developments. I will then 
use two examples – cosmetic surgery 
and predictive genetic testing – to il-
lustrate current tendencies towards 
the renaturalisation of social inequali-
ties. Finally, I will present some gen-
eral theoretical conclusions. 
 
2 Beyond the Modern Nature-
Society-Divide? 
For a long time, modern societies and 
their institutions have relied on the 
belief that the distinction between the 
social and the natural can be drawn by 
science in an objective, unambiguous, 
and universally applicable way. 
Boundaries that have been fundamen-
tal to modern self-perception, such as 
those between facts and values, are 
based on this belief. These boundaries 
play a central role in many institu-
tional spheres of modern societies. 
This is especially visible in professional 
sports: only the results the athlete is 
able to achieve naturally are consid-
ered valid, and this has led to the in-
troduction of an extensive doping con-
trol system. But at this point it also 
becomes clear that the boundaries 
between the "natural" and the "ma-
nipulated" body are no longer unambi-
guous: they are blurred by the use of 
biological substances for doping or the 
supposedly imminent application of 
methods of genetic enhancement 
("gene doping") (cf. Wehling 2003a).  
In recent years, a multitude of topical 
societal debates – for example, about 
the beginning of human life and brain 
death, about global climate change 
and genetically modified organisms – 
have shown that the categorical sepa-
ration of nature and society that had 
previously appeared unambiguous is 
becoming increasingly unclear. Devel-
opments in intensive care medicine 
and transplant surgery, for instance, 
have led to the fact that the common-
sense notion of the end of human life – 
a failure of the heart and lungs – has 
not simply been replaced but supple-
mented by and contrasted with the 
criterion of brain death (cf. Lock 1998, 
2003; Schlich/Wiesemann 2002; Lin-
demann 2003). The answer to the 
question of when a human being is 
considered dead and thus ceases to be 
a social being entitled to a certain pro-
tection has become open to interpreta-
tion and has generated widely differing 
answers. The intensely polarising de-
bates in these areas are indicative of 
the fact that a sharp and uncontested 
"cut" between the natural and the so-
cial is becoming increasingly impossi-
ble. This is not to say that an objective 
boundary that once used to exist is 
now dissolving due to scientific and 
technical innovations. Rather, the sci-
ences that used to guarantee the ob-
jectivity of this distinction are less and 
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less able to fulfil this role, be it that the 
sciences themselves develop varying 
interpretations or that sciences and 
commonsense knowledge come into 
conflict. The former holds true for the 
debate about the legal and moral 
status of the human embryo; although 
it is possible to draw several lines to 
determine when a human life starts, it 
seems impossible to name one objec-
tive, exclusive point in time (cf. Markl 
2004). One example of the latter case 
is the social conflict concerning agri-
cultural biotechnology. Widespread 
notions of the "unnaturalness" of ge-
netically modified foods (cf. Shaw 
2002) clash with the scientific state-
ment that there is no substantial dif-
ference between such foods and tradi-
tional, "naturally" grown produce. The 
consequence of such disputes is not to 
say that modern societies can straight-
forwardly do away with the distinction 
between what is given or "grown" on 
the one hand and what is "made" (and 
thus to be accounted for) on the other. 
However, the redefined and re-
established boundaries are increas-
ingly demonstrating their "reflexive", 
contingent character. Examples of this 
kind of flexibilisation are the rules for 
dealing with cloned human embryos 
and genetically engineered foods, 
which vary greatly on an international 
level, or the ongoing debate about the 
man-made vs. natural origins of cli-
mate change (see Wehling et al. 2005). 
As the historian of science Hans-Jörg 
Rheinberger (1996: 289) supposes in 
regard to biomedicine and genetic 
engineering, we are currently becom-
ing "witnesses to a global and irre-
versible transformation of living be-
ings, including humans, into purpose-
fully constructed beings". The decisive 
factor is that with the advent of mo-
lecular biology, "for the first time ever" 
metabolic processes have become 
"open to manipulation on the level of 
instruction" (ibid.: 291 – italics in 
original). According to Rheinberger, 
the organism itself becomes a labora-
tory: "From now on, it is not the ex-
tracellular representation of intracellu-
lar processes, i.e. the 'understanding' 
of life, that counts. Instead, what mat-
ters is the intracellular representation 
of an extracellular project, i.e. the 're-
writing' of life." (ibid.) As a result, the 
social understanding of "natural" dif-
ferences and inequalities as well as the 
collective and individual dealing with 
them can change profoundly. 
Rheinberger argues that the "mission 
of sociality" no longer seems to be 
"…to neutralise our natural – genetic – 
constitution, but to change it. We are 
becoming aware that the construction 
of a natural constitution of humankind 
is changing into a social construct –  
with the result that the distinction 
between the 'natural' and the 'social' 
no longer makes any proper ontologi-
cal sense." (ibid.: 298 – italics in origi-
nal). The fiction of ontology, promoted 
by the sciences, loses its persuasive-
ness, and thus the idea of the "natural" 
or "grown" no longer seems to serve 
the purpose of cultural and normative 
orientation. Using the examples of 
cosmetic surgery and predictive ge-
netic testing, I want to show how not 
only the overarching distinction be-
tween the natural and the social has 
been eroded, but also how more spe-
cific boundaries – for example, be-
tween illness and health or between 
healing and optimising the human 
body – have become ambiguous. As a 
consequence, there is a tendency to-
wards renaturalising social inequalities 
in modern societies. 
 
3 Cosmetic Surgery: The Techni-
cal Improvement of the Body 
as a Social Norm? 
With the help of aggressive advertising 
and media promotion, the surgical 
remodelling of the body has become 
almost completely disconnected from 
therapeutic contexts (for example, 
healing victims of war or accidents) 
during recent decades.6 It is becoming 
a "mass phenomenon" (Davis 1995: 
                                                                 
6 Nevertheless, the boundaries between 
healing of physical deformities and/or the 
ensuing psychological traumas on the one 
hand, and the enhancement and optimisa-
tion of a "normal" and "healthy" body on 
the other are not fixed. Cosmetic surgery is 
thus a striking example of a wider tendency 
towards "dissolving the boundaries of ther-
apy" (Entgrenzung von Therapie) in modern 
societies. The use of medical technologies 
is increasingly expanding beyond well-
defined therapeutic contexts.  
Peter Wehling, Social Inequalities  
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16), a virtually everyday practice that is 
no longer a taboo. In his book "Cul-
tural History of Aesthetic Surgery", 
Sander Gilman states that "the stigma-
tising quality of the procedures seems 
to be diminishing" (1999: 33). It is es-
timated that the number of cosmetic 
operations in the Federal Republic of 
Germany has tripled over the last ten 
years, and that about half a million to 
a million procedures are carried out 
every year (Kahlweit 2004; cf. also 
Degele 2004: 19). For other countries, 
such as the United States, Brazil, or 
China, even more dramatic increases 
in numbers are estimated. Patients are 
becoming younger and younger, and 
although women are still in the major-
ity, more and more men also use cos-
metic surgery.7 
One's "own" body increasingly seems 
to be regarded as something that can 
be shaped to suit one's wishes. Appar-
ently, its "naturalness" and "integrity" 
no longer serve as barriers to technical 
interventions. This becomes interest-
ing for social theory and the sociology 
of social inequalities inasmuch as 
cosmetic surgery is carried out not just 
to enhance self-esteem or recognition 
in the social sphere, but is also becom-
ing a tool of career planning (cf. De-
gele 2004: 15). This seems to be an 
increasingly important motive for cus-
tomers. In the People's Republic of 
China, more than half the university 
graduates interviewed stated that 
"beauty is a decisive advantage in the 
job market" (Maass 2004a: 1). There is 
no question that the use of make-up, 
hair dye, dieting, etc. has always been 
a means of enhancing one's chances in 
the job market or rising through the 
ranks in a company. Cosmetic surgery 
has transformed and radicalised these 
practices by no longer aiming at 
                                                                 
7 There is now a debate in the social sci-
ences as to how far these equalizing ten-
dencies will go. While Gilman (1999: 32) 
argues that men will gradually catch up 
with women, Davis (2003: 129) supposes 
"that the present gender gap in cosmetic 
surgery will prevail rather than it will dis-
appear". In any case the motives and con-
texts vis-à-vis the use of cosmetic surgery 
are different for male and female "custom-
ers", and cosmetic surgery is by no means 
"gender-neutral" (ibid.) 
changes on the body but of the body. 
Moreover, these changes are brought 
about by "invasive" surgical interven-
tions that used to be almost exclu-
sively reserved for therapeutic pur-
poses. Such interventions are not only 
risky, painful, and rarely reversible. 
They also massively question the clas-
sic modern idea of the integrity and 
physical invulnerability of the body 
(Negrin 2002: 29). Against this back-
ground, cosmetic surgery can be seen 
as an example of a transition from the 
"natural artificiality" of the human 
being that was conceived by Helmuth 
Plessner (1981) as an anthropological 
invariable to a new and apparently 
much more problematic "artificial 
naturalness" (cf. Schramme 2002: 266-
269). 
The optimisation of the body via surgi-
cal procedures is increasingly becom-
ing a social normalcy and even an 
expectation, at least in certain social 
milieus and segments of the job or 
marriage markets. Along the "border-
line" between nature and society, the 
look of the body is becoming "physical 
capital", as one could say in extension 
of Pierre Bourdieu's differentiation 
between certain kinds of capital 
(Bourdieu 1983).8 Cosmetic surgery 
constitutes the body as an object and 
medium of investment and accumula-
tion of capital to a much higher degree 
than practices such as cosmetics, 
sport, or diets (cf. Negrin 2002: 36). 
Instead of cultural refining or the long 
and disciplined route of doing sports, 
the direct investment of financial re-
sources moves centre-stage; long-term 
individual "achievement" with uncer-
tain results is replaced by short-term 
visible "success" (cf. Neckel 2001). In 
this process, new and mostly anony-
mous societal patterns of domination 
arise – not so much because a fixed 
and (for most people) unreachable 
ideal of beauty is established, but more 
because the flexibility and willingness 
to continuously shape and "correct" 
the body is set as a cultural norm: 
"(N)o one is so beautiful that she can-
                                                                 
8 The US singer and actress Cher stated: 
"My body is my capital." She is said to have 
invested about 75,000 US dollars in cos-
metic surgery. (Quote from Davis 1995: 18) 
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not become even more so with the 
help of surgery." (Davis 1995: 18) 
At first sight, this development is tak-
ing place within the framework of the 
denaturalisation programme pursued 
by modern societies. The German phi-
losopher Wolfgang Kersting emphati-
cally celebrates the release from the 
arbitrariness of nature that the appli-
cation of technical means has made 
possible: "With the help of technology, 
humans can emancipate themselves 
from nature and weaken the power of 
fate. Technology liberates via defatali-
sation and by increasing the power of 
control." (Kersting 2002: 294) The 
given and – with regard to beauty, 
strength, etc. – of course unequal as 
well as "unjust" distribution of physical 
attributes between individuals be-
comes the object of conscious and 
purposeful fashioning.9 Feminist au-
thors such as Kathy Davis (1995, 2003) 
rightly point out that women who un-
derwent cosmetic operations try to 
regain control over their bodies and 
their heteronomous social perception. 
But this emancipation from the natural 
body, with all its real or imagined 
shortcomings, also results in a para-
doxical effect of renaturalisation: 
physical attributes such as beauty or 
youthfulness gain enormous impor-
tance, can be used as a means of so-
cial distinction, and can even lead to 
advantages concerning one's career. 
Obviously this is seen less and less as 
questionable or illegitimate, because 
"body looks" are increasingly the result 
of technical modelling and can thus be 
attributed as an acquired trait to the 
respective person: "(W)e have become 
responsible for the design of our bod-
ies." (Negrin 2002: 37) This is equally 
valid if the person has not had cos-
                                                                 
9 In this context, it is remarkable that at a 
beauty contest in the People's Republic of 
China in 2004, proof of having had at least 
one instance of cosmetic surgery was a 
precondition for registering for the contest, 
and not – as usual – a reason for immedi-
ate exclusion (Maass 2004b). The organis-
ers rewarded not the ("unjustly" distrib-
uted) natural beauty, but an artificial one 
instead – but this of course cannot be at-
tained and perfected without certain "natu-
ral" bodily preconditions and sufficient 
economic resources. 
metic surgery: even the "natural" body 
that has not been manipulated is re-
garded as something socially imput-
able and as an object of social respon-
sibility. Denaturalisation and renatu-
ralisation of the social merge into one 
another, the distinction between as-
cribed and achieved characteristics 
becomes blurred and starts to lose its 
function of normative orientation. 
 
4 Predictive Genetic Testing: Dis-
crimination or Legitimate Dif-
ferentiation? 
The case of predictive genetic testing 
demonstrates even more markedly 
than cosmetic surgery the newness, 
ambiguity, and ambivalence of the 
renaturalisation of social inequalities. 
The aim of predictive genetic testing is 
the diagnosis of individual genetic 
dispositions, based upon which it is 
possible to forecast, with a greater or 
lesser degree of probability, the occur-
rence of certain diseases such as he-
reditary breast cancer or Huntington 
Disease in later periods of life. For 
three reasons, this is a medical innova-
tion with potentially serious conse-
quences: firstly, predictive DNA tests 
make long-term prognoses over sev-
eral years or even decades. Secondly, 
not only is it often unclear when, but 
also whether the disease will occur at 
all. This particularly applies when it 
comes to widespread diseases such as 
cancer or Alzheimer's that are not ex-
clusively genetically determined, but 
are also dependent on environmental 
factors. Moreover, in many cases sci-
entists dispute the extent to which 
genetic factors actually heighten the 
risk of becoming ill. Thirdly, the devel-
opment of prevention and therapy falls 
short of the rapidly expanding diag-
nostics (cf. Damm 2004: 2).10 
It is not surprising that this asymmetry 
can lead to grave social and psycho-
logical problems. On the one hand, the 
                                                                 
10 Genetic factors are held responsible for 
more and more diseases. The number of 
these (putatively) "genetic diseases" regis-
tered in the so-called McKusick Catalogue 
– an important medical database – was 
about 5,000 in 1992, and rose to more than 
14,000 in 2003 (Lemke 2004: 69). 
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people or families affected have to deal 
with the specific uncertainties of pre-
dictive genetic testing (cf. Cox/McKellin 
1999): will the disease occur at all, 
when will it happen, and how serious 
will it be? How should one deal with 
the new knowledge and its ambiva-
lences? Is it possible to protect oneself 
against the occurrence of the dis-
ease?11 Or is it preferable to refrain 
from being tested at all because its use 
is dubious, given that prevention and 
therapy are lacking? On the other 
hand, this new form of diagnostics 
creates a new social category of "ill 
without symptoms" (Nelkin 1995) or 
"healthy ill" – the boundary between 
health and illness is being redefined, 
pluralised, and threatens to become 
blurred (Feuerstein et al. 2002: 42). 
Predictive genetic testing has thus 
become part of a tendency to "de-
temporalise" illness, i.e. to expand the 
notion of illness beyond its acute, 
symptomatic manifestation and shift it 
to certain risk factors. Not only genetic 
dispositions, but also obesity and high 
blood pressure are part of these risk 
factors. Risk thus becomes an "illness 
category in and of itself" (Fosket 2004: 
294), and the de-temporalisation of 
illness due to predictive diagnostics 
manifests itself in questions that are 
unusual and difficult to answer: "When 
does an hereditary disease 'begin'? At 
the moment of conception? With the 
knowledge that one has inherited the 
mutation? Once symptoms are unde-
niable? With diagnosis?" (Cox/Mc Kel-
lin 1999: 137) 
With regard to the "pre-symptomatic 
ill", concerns have been raised for a 
few years now about the emergence of 
new forms of "genetic discrimination" 
or even a new "genetic underclass". 
"The term 'genetic discrimination' has 
been used to describe the differential 
treatment of individuals or their rela-
tives based on actual or presumed 
                                                                 
11 The best-known example of this dilemma 
is the prophylactic amputation of the 
breasts of women who are genetically "at 
risk" of developing breast cancer (cf. Hal-
lowell 1999). The extent to which muta-
tions of the so-called "breast cancer genes" 
BRCA 1 and BRCA 2 raise the real risk of 
developing the disease is still a matter of 
debate (cf. Lemke 2004: 71-72).  
genetic differences, as opposed to 
discrimination based on phenotype." 
(Geller et al. 2002: 248) Especially in 
the United States, with its privatised 
social service and insurance systems, 
these effects are already starting to 
appear (Geller et al. 2002; Geller 2002): 
people who will only fall ill with a pre-
dicted disease in a few years' time - or 
perhaps never - are nonetheless dis-
criminated against or even excluded 
from the job market, health services, 
and insurance. At the centre of the 
political and legal debates about pre-
dictive testing and genetic discrimina-
tion is the "right to ignorance" (Recht 
auf Nichtwissen, cf. Damm 1999; Weh-
ling 2003b). Although quite unusual 
and unprecedented in modern socie-
ties, this right not to know one's own 
genetic constitution is in principle 
widely accepted. However, there is 
disagreement about the conditions 
under which individuals are obliged to 
get information about their genetic 
condition and reveal it to others (for 
example, to employers or insurance 
companies).12 In addition, the question 
is how one can prevent the exercising 
of this "right to ignorance" from be-
coming a reason for social discrimina-
tion in itself.  
The object of predictive genetic testing 
is not the factual visibility and actual 
presence of "phenotypical" differences 
between individuals. Thus, th ough not 
exactly in the same way as cosmetic 
surgery, genetic testing also creates 
and is concerned with a scientifically 
and technically manufactured "nature" 
that is taken out of its "real" temporal 
context. This results in many far-
reaching categorical and normative 
ambiguities: may or must people who 
                                                                 
12 For the legal aspects, compare Damm 
2004. Recently, the Federation of German 
Insurance Companies has extended the 
voluntary renunciation of obligatory ge-
netic testing for customers signing a new 
contract until 2011. However, the medical 
superintendent of the world's biggest rein-
surance company, the 'Münchener Rück', 
declared only a few months later that, due 
to "fascinating developments", the insur-
ance companies do not want any legal 
inhibition of the option to use genetic 
testing (Frankfurter Rundschau, 22.1.2005, 
4). 
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are genetically "at risk" be treated like 
virtual patients, or is that an illegiti-
mate discrimination against obviously 
healthy people? The epistemic status 
of predictive genetic knowledge itself 
thus becomes contested (cf. Damm 
2004: 15): do the results of predictive 
diagnostics have a special status? Or 
can they be seen as a "normal" form of 
gathering medical information, as 
commonly used by insurance compa-
nies?13 And if so, is it still appropriate 
to speak of genetic discrimination? 
Scientific views on this issue differ 
widely, and mirror the categorical am-
bivalence of the problem. The debates 
focus on the question of whether a 
genetic disposition to certain diseases 
has to be regarded as an objective, 
natural cause or a social, scientific 
construct. The lawyer Jochen Taupitz, 
a member of the German national 
council on bioethics (Nationaler Ethik-
rat), argues that it is only possible to 
speak of discrimination if a person is 
treated differently "without a recognis-
able, factual reason" (Taupitz 2000: 
31). According to Taupitz, the "poten-
tially dangerous genetic disposition" 
(die gefahrerhebliche genetische Dispo-
sition) is "just as much as an illness, 
age, or (…) gender a factual reason for 
differentiation" (ibid.). Here, the ge-
netic disposition is equated with an 
already manifest illness (or with old 
age and gender), and thus objectified 
as a natural fact and cause. The biolo-
gist and philosopher Christoph Reh-
mann-Sutter proposes a different view. 
He criticises the widely acknowledged 
"programme theory of DNA", which is 
also recognisable in Taupitz's state-
ments; it presupposes that the genetic 
programme "contains an instruction to 
develop this characteristic or illness" 
(Rehmann-Sutter 2002: 217). Reh-
mann-Sutter contrasts this view with a 
"systemic theory of DNA", according to 
which a certain gene sequence is in-
deed a trace (ein Indiz), but does not 
already make the disease a latent real-
ity in the present time (ibid.: 218): "The 
BRCA-1-mutation correlates with an 
                                                                 
13 Similar debates have recently surfaced in 
Germany, especially with regard to (secret) 
DNA-based paternity testing and the so-
called "genetic fingerprint". 
increased probability of getting cancer 
in the future, and is statistically signifi-
cant; however, it is not an already pre-
sent instruction for cancer." (ibid.: 221) 
In this view, the mutation of the gene 
is certainly a natural fact, but the cor-
relation with the disease is a statistical 
construct, not an objective causal 
mechanism. In any case, it becomes 
evident that the blurring of the 
boundaries between health and illness, 
between factual and interpretative 
statements, between illegitimate dis-
crimination and objectively justified 
differentiation, creates new areas of 
categorical and normative ambiva-
lences that modern societies are not 
yet prepared for.14 As Taupitz's argu-
ments illustrate, new discursive hori-
zons are opened up, in which differen-
tial treatment of individuals due to 
their supposedly natural genetic dispo-
sition can be legitimised or even pre-
sented as necessary. 
  
5 Conclusion: Neutralising or 
Optimising (Human) Nature? 
What can be concluded from the ex-
amples I have given? First of all, I want 
to show why the recent tendencies 
differ from older forms of discrimina-
tion based on "natural" categories. 
Finally, I will show what constitutes 
the new challenges for normative self-
perception as well as the institutional-
ised practices of modern societies.  
Older forms of naturalising social ine-
qualities are mostly based on stigma-
tising people according to supposedly 
natural collectives such as race, nation, 
gender, sexual orientation, etc. that 
were - of course - always socially con-
structed (more often than not with the 
help of the sciences). The individual is 
discriminated against because it is 
seen as part of a larger group, and the 
"natural", presumedly homogenous 
and inalterable characteristics of the 
group are ascribed to the respective 
person. By contrast, renaturalised ine-
                                                                 
14 What is new here is that these ambiva-
lences and uncertainties are the results of 
modern biomedicine itself rather than the 
consequences of a lack of "exact" scientific 
knowledge. 
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qualities follow a quite different pat-
tern: they aim at a person's individua l-
ised body which is by no means re-
garded as stable and inalterable, but 
increasingly as flexible and shapeable. 
It can thus be attributed as an ac-
quired characteristic. This fundamental 
difference between "naturalised" and 
"renaturalised" inequalities becomes 
very clear with regard to a shift in the 
meaning and role of cosmetic surgery 
over the last few decades. As Sander 
Gilman has shown, aesthetic surgery 
served for a long time as a means of 
rendering invisible physical features 
(such as an "Irish" or "Jewish" nose) 
that were used by dominant groups to 
stigmatise or exclude certain minori-
ties. "Moving into and becoming in-
visible within a desired 'natural' 
group", was the objective of the surgi-
cal procedure (Gilman 1999: 22). In 
this context, it is important to notice 
that "the nineteenth-century 'Jew' who 
desired to be a 'German' assumed that 
'German' was a real category defined in 
nature rather than a social construct" 
(ibid.) Certainly, current cosmetic sur-
gery still serves as a means of covering 
or removing undesirable physical fea-
tures that supposedly do not fit the 
"norm". Yet, it does not primarily aim 
at escaping from collective identity 
constructions and discriminations, but 
instead suggests a positive shaping 
and optimisation of the respective 
individual self, however much that 
may be an illusion. This holds particu-
larly true in the case of women who, in 
the eyes of men, are of course re-
garded as members of a (putatively 
inferior) collective group and thus 
placed into a "constant condition of 
bodily insecurity" (Bourdieu 2005: 
117). Nevertheless, even in this case 
the use of cosmetic surgery does not 
aim at denying or making invisible the 
individual woman's relationship with 
the "natural group", nor does it help to 
break the dominant patterns of per-
ception. Feminist authors justly see 
this as "the dilemma of cosmetic sur-
gery" (Davis 1995). "The limitation of 
cosmetic surgery is that it offers a 
technological solution to a social 
problem." (Negrin 2002: 25)  
The promise of emancipation from the 
"naturally given", together with that of 
individual self-optimisation, is – per-
haps surprisingly – also connected to 
predictive genetic testing. Genetic dis-
positions can of course not simply be 
done away with, but genetic testing 
goes along with both the promise and 
the social expectation that the people 
or families affected will adapt their 
lifestyles to their genetic constitutions 
(cf. Hallowell 1999; Conrad 2002; 
Lemke 2004). Under favourable cir-
cumstances, this may lead to the 
emergence of what Paul Rabinow has 
termed "biosocial" communities, for 
example self-help groups or patients' 
associations that meet on the basis of 
a common genetic diagnosis in order 
"to share their experiences, lobby for 
their disease, educate their children, 
redo their home environment, and so 
on" (Rabinow 1996: 102). What Rabi-
now links with the term "biosociality" 
is the ultimately optimistic expectation 
that, in the future, culture will no 
longer be "biologised" (as in sociobiol-
ogy) but, in contrast, nature will "be 
modeled on culture understood as 
practice" (ibid.: 99). "Nature will be 
known and remade through technique 
and will finally become artificial, just 
as culture becomes natural." (ibid.) The 
results of this "overcoming the na-
ture/culture split" (Rabinow) will 
probably be more ambivalent and 
questionable than Rabinow seems to 
be aware. Especially in the case of 
genetic testing, the "socialisation" of 
nature (denaturalisation) is likely to be 
outweighed and countered by a simul-
taneous "biologisation" of society (re-
naturalisation): "Culture invades na-
ture, while from a dialectical point of 
view it becomes more and more 'natu-
ralized'." (Bertilsson 2003: 119)  
The tendency to renaturalise social 
inequalities does not make individuals 
subject to a fateful (collective) nature. 
Quite the contrary: they are supposed 
or even forced to be responsible for 
their "natural" or "genetic" fate on their 
own. Nevertheless, one should not 
draw too sharp a dividing line between 
the "old" and the "new" forms of ine-
qualities based on natural categories. 
The fact that the insertion of an addi-
tional palpebral fissure to make the 
eye bigger and "more Western" is one 
of the most popular surgical proce-
dures in the People's Republic of China 
(Gilman 1999: 98ff.; Maass 2004a), 
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illustrates that the optimisation of the 
individual body and the adaptation to 
hegemonial, "racialised" body images 
and norms may overlap and even rein-
force each other. Rabinow points out a 
somewhat different potential interac-
tion: "In complicated and often insidi-
ous ways, the older categories may 
even take on a renewed force as the 
new genetics begins to spread not only 
in the obvious racism so rampant to-
day but more subtly in studies of 
'blacks', alleged to have higher suscep-
tibility to tuberculosis." (Rabinow 
1996: 103) 
The normative self-perception and 
institutional practices of modern so-
cieties have hitherto been based – 
more implicitly than explicitly – on a 
remarkable arrangement of natural 
differences and social inequalities that 
is by no means self-evident but rather 
fragile. According to this modern ar-
rangement, natural differences among 
humans are seen as inalterable (or 
alterable only to a very limited degree) 
but at the same time contingent and 
not subject to the responsibility of the 
individual person. Biological inequali-
ties and "injustices" are taken as given 
(or had to be taken as such for the lack 
of technical options). But exactly for 
this reason, it is even more urgent that 
their importance for (and influence on) 
social life should be restricted and 
"neutralised", as Rheinberger (1996) 
has put it, for example by introducing 
anti-discrimination policies. Where 
neutralisation is not possible, there 
should at least be compensatory 
measures on the part of the welfare 
state.15 The new scientific and techni-
                                                                 
15 How fragile and contested this arrange-
ment actually is, is highlighted by current 
political and philosophical debates that 
aim at a discursive "renaturalisation of 
social inequalities" (Große Kracht 2004). 
One striking example is the ethics of natu-
ral merits ("verdienstethischer Naturalis-
mus") recently outlined by the philosopher 
Wolfgang Kersting. According to Kersting, 
contingent differences in the natural con-
stitution of individuals are nevertheless 
attributable as a merit. There is thus nei-
ther a right to compensation nor a duty to 
neutralise or compensate for resulting 
social inequalities (Kersting 2000: 369-71; 
cf. for a critical discussion Große Kracht 
2004). 
cal options of "body improvement" 
(Schlich 2001) seem to open up this 
arrangement: physical inequalities 
(even where they are far from being 
diseases or handicaps) are increasingly 
being "corrected" technically, instead 
of being politically neutralised and 
weakened vis-à-vis their social conse-
quences. As Llewellyn Negrin following 
Gilman states, the advent of cosmetic 
surgery has shifted the modern expec-
tation of personal development and 
self-transformation: "(T)he enlighten-
ment belief in the ability of individuals 
to transform themselves, which has 
been articulated as a social and politi-
cal task, came to be redefined in bio-
logical and medical terms." (Negrin 
2002: 25). To a hitherto unprecedented 
extent, the biological constitution of 
individuals becomes a direct object of 
no longer mainly therapeutic but in-
creasingly optimising medical and 
technical interventions (Council on 
Bioethics 2003). It is a seemingly para-
doxical consequence that at the same 
time a manufactured "nature" is pro-
gressively established as a legitimate 
medium of social distinction and dis-
crimination. What is more, the eco-
nomic resources to participate in the 
benefits of body improvement are still 
distributed in a highly unequal way.  
The arguments that only emphasize 
the increase in individual autonomy 
due to these new developments (cf. for 
instance Birnbacher 2002; Kersting 
2002) negate the other side of the coin, 
namely the emergence of dominant 
new norms of behaviour as well as of 
new social inequalities. The negative 
flipside of "defatalisation" (Kersting) 
consists in expanding pressures and 
demands for the optimisation of the 
individual body or, at least, for the 
adaptation of one's lifestyle to one's 
"natural" genetic constitution. The 
emancipation from the natural body 
and its inadequacies merges in the 
self-subordination to the social norm 
of body enhancement.16 Obviously, the 
given physical nature of humans – be it 
considered normatively inviolable or 
factually immutable – no longer serves 
as a boundary for technical manipula-
                                                                 
16 This is most visible in the doping scan-
dals of professional athletes. 
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tion that should not be transgressed. 
"When nature no longer provides hu-
man society with its boundary condi-
tions (for normal practices), where will 
they be settled?" (Bertilsson 2003: 119) 
Whether and how it will be possible to 
establish new, socially accepted, and 
institutionally stabilised boundaries for 
the interacting dynamics of denaturali-
sation and renaturalisation of individ-
ual differences and social inequalities 
turns out to be a key question for the 
present "reflexive modern" s ocieties.  
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